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Evidence/Constitutional Law -THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POSTHYPNOTIC
TESTIMONY: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO TESTIFY- Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987)
O N THE night of July 2, 1983, Frank Rock refused to let his wife
Vickie leave their small apartment to get a hamburger.' When
the police arrived later that evening, they found Frank Rock on the
floor, with a bullet wound in his chest.2 From the evidence the jury
heard, Vickie Rock's guilt seemed apparent.' She was convicted of
manslaughter, and received the maximum sentence.4
However, a complete reading of the record reveals a drastically dif-
ferent set of facts. Vickie Rock recalled after the shooting that al-
though her thumb was on the hammer of the gun at the moment of
discharge, her finger had not been on the trigger. She further recalled
that the gun had discharged unexpectedly when her husband grabbed
her arm in an ensuing scuffle.5 These recollections led to an examina-
tion of the gun by an expert who corroborated her recollections by
concluding that the gun was defective and prone to discharge when hit
or dropped. 6 Though the testimony offered by the gun expert was
later admitted at trial, vital portions of Vickie Rock's testimony were
not permitted to reach the jury. This critical testimony was ruled inad-
missible because her recollections occurred after her memory was re-
freshed through hypnosis. 7 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed
Rock's conviction, and established a per se rule excluding all posthyp-
notic testimony. 8
Upon review of Vickie Rock's case, the United States Supreme
Court declared that "restrictions of a defendant's right to testify may
not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed
to serve" 9 and held that Arkansas' per se exclusion of the defendant's
posthypnotic testimony "infringes impermissibly on the right of a de-
1. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987) (No. 86-130).
2. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2706 (1987).
3. One of the attending officers testified that the defendant told him that "she stood up to
leave the room and [her husband] grabbed her by the throat and choked her and threw her
against the wall and ... at that time she walked over and picked up the weapon and pointed it
toward the floor and he hit her again and she shot him." Id.
4. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
5. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2707.
6. Id.
7. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 568, 708 S.W.2d 78, 79 (1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2704
(1987).
8. Id.
9. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
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fendant to testify on his or her own behalf."' 0 In so holding, the
Court reaffirmed that constitutional principles must be considered in
the formulation and application of state evidentiary rules. The hold-
ing also suggests general guidelines for courts confronted with the
problem of posthypnotic testimony.
Courts have traditionally prohibited witnesses from testifying while
hypnotized." Courts differ, however, in their treatment of testimony
elicited following memory refreshment by hypnosis. Four approaches
have been developed concerning the admissibility of posthypnotic tes-
timony. One older approach is unconditional admissibility, under
which the facts and circumstances surrounding hypnotic sessions are
considered to go toward the reliability-not the admissability-of post-
hypnotic testimony.' 2 A more recent solution, aimed predominantly
at correcting the deficiencies of the admissibility approach, is one of
conditional admissibility.' 3 Here, posthypnotic testimony is admissible
insofar as certain procedural requirements surrounding the hypnotic
sessions are met-requirements aimed quite specifically at increasing
the reliability of a witness' performance under hypnosis. The third ap-
proach, per se inadmissibility, assumes at the outset the inherent unre-
liability of memory refreshment via hypnosis, and prevents witnesses
from testifying to any events recalled after the hypnotic session.' 4 A
still newer approach, modeled after the spirit if not the letter of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, requires admissibility to be decided on a
case-by-case basis, by weighing the probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial effect. 5
This Note first will briefly review the more common approaches to
the problem of admissibility. The author argues that per se inadmissi-
bility is unduly restrictive, ignores the benefits of hypnosis, and denies
10. Id. at 2714-15.
11. Courts recognized relatively early that undue prejudice might result from allowing a
witness or defendant to appear before the jury while hypnotized. Greenfield v. Commonwealth,
214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974). See also P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 12-3 (1986); L. TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC INTERROGATION § 4-2 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). See also Sies & Wester, Judicial Approaches to the Question of the
Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: A History and Analysis, 35 DE PAUL L.
REV. 77, 89 (1985). For a discussion of the Harding case and others tracking the admissibility
approach, see infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
13. See cases cited infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
14. The most notorious of the "per se inadmissibility" cases is People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d
18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). Shirley and cases
holding similarly are discussed infra notes 105-14, and in accompanying text.
15. FED. R. Evln. 403. Cases tracking the logic of Rule 403 are discussed infra notes 136-
48, and in accompanying text.
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the use of potentially crucial evidence. 1 6 This Note will then explore
the Rock decision, which declared unconstitutional Arkansas' applica-
tion of a per se approach as it pertained solely to the defendant's testi-
mony. Analysis of the constitutional issues which the Court suggests
should play a role in determining admissibility seems to imply that per
se exclusion may likewise have unconstitutional implications when ap-
plied to a defendant's witnesses as well. Finally, the author suggests
that the constitutional considerations identified by the Court favor a
case-by-case balancing approach as the most effective solution to the
problem, with the accused's constitutional rights playing an integral
role in the calculus.
I. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY
Judges confronted with witnesses who have been hypnotized are
forced to consider the influences of hypnosis upon the trial court's
truth-seeking function. The dilemma presented by a hypnotically in-
fluenced witness demands some understanding of how such a witness
differs from other witnesses. This section presents some basic observa-
tions concerning the effects of memory refreshment by hypnosis, and
reviews the approaches courts have developed for systematically con-
fronting the problems created by the practice.
A. Inherent Problems Versus Effective Uses
Hypnosis remains an inexact and mysterious science. Disagreement
still exists over such basics as a suitable definition for the phenome-
non. 7 As the Supreme Court recognized in Rock, 8 the Council on
Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association admits that
there is "no single, generally accepted theory of hypnosis, nor is there
16. The status afforded posthypnotic testimony at trial may be determinative of whether
hypnosis may be used during investigations. A number of courts and commentators, in opting
for a per se exclusionary rule, have noted that due to the unreliability of posthypnotic testimony
and its "hardening" effects upon the memory of witnesses, the hypnotic procedure substantially
reduces the effectiveness of cross-examination. Several courts have declared witnesses to be com-
pletely incompetent to testify after having undergone hypnosis. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d
18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982), discussed infra notes
105-14 and accompanying text. In these and like jurisdictions, investigators who choose to sub-
ject witnesses to hypnotic procedures are forced to "gamble" that the benefits of these proce-
dures will be worth the price-since any information recalled after the hypnotic session will be
declared inadmissible.
17. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELREED, supra note 11, § 12- 2, at 346; L. TAYLOR, supra note
11, at 4. See also Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 79-81.
18. See Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2713 (1987).
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consensus about a single definition."' 9 Researchers also disagree over
the effects of hypnosis on later memory recall. Although more mod-
ern studies confirm that in many cases hypnosis is frequently responsi-
ble for producing more detailed recall,20 the primary question of
reliability remains. Subjects may, consciously or unconsciously, pro-
duce false memories .2 This section explores the various factors which
contribute to the fallibility of hypnosis as a memory enhancing device.
Because the hypnotic state is one of heightened suggestibility, 22 the
subject becomes highly susceptible to cues provided, intentionally or
unintentionally, by the hypnotist. 23 In addition, pressures placed on
the subject by the desire to recall, by hypnotic suggestion, or by ques-
tions aimed at eliciting past events may cause the subject to confabu-
late, or fill in gaps in memory with events that may never have
occurred. One expert explained that hypnosis "may jog the subject's
memory and produce some increased recall, but it will also cause him
to fill in details that are plausible but consist of memories or fantasies
from other times." ' 24 In addition, the subject may deceive even an ex-
perienced hypnotist by feigning the hypnotic state, 25 thus introducing
the possibility of willful manipulation of the hypnotic session.
The inherent unreliability of posthypnotic testimony can create seri-
ous constitutional problems when the technique is used by the prose-
cution as a basis for suspect identification. In Stovall v. Denno,26 the
Supreme Court recognized that a defendant could be denied due proc-
ess when identification procedures were "unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.' '27 This standard was
19. COUNCI. ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF REFRESHING RECOLLECTION BY
THE USE OF HYPNOSIS, reprinted in 253 J. A.M.A. 1918, 1919 (1985) [hereinafter COUNCIL RE-
PORT, REFRESHING RECOLLECTION].
20. See Note, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony and the Balancing Pendulum, 1985 U. ILL.
L. REV. 921, 934 n.104.
21. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 311, 320 (1979).
22. Alderman & Barrette, Hypnosis on Trial, A Practical Perspective on the Application of
Forensic Hypnosis in Criminal Cases, 18 CPIM. L. BULL. 5 (1982).
23. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1980). Professor Diamond notes:
The suggestive instructions and cues provided to the subject need not be, and often are
not, verbal. The attitude, demeanor, and expectations of the hypnotist, his tone of
voice, and his body language may all communicate suggestive messages to the subject.
Especially powerful as an agent of suggestion is the context and purpose of the hyp-
notic session. Most hypnotic subjects aim to please.
Id. at 333.
24. Orne, supra note 21, at 317-18.
25. Id.
26. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
27. Id. at 302.
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narrowed in later cases to preclude identification procedures which
produced a "substantial likelihood of misidentification, ' 28 and still
later, in Manson v. Brathwaite, to reach only those procedures which
carried "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifica-
tion. '" 29 These constitutional standards were articulated based upon
identifications generally and are not limited to identifications associ-
ated with hypnosis. Although the Court has invoked this reasoning to
hold identification procedures invalid on only one occasion,30 the cir-
cuit courts have developed analogous exclusionary principles in cases
involving suspect identification through posthypnotic testimony.
In United States v. Valdez,3 the court took note of a general lack of
corroboration for the victim's posthypnotic testimony, and held that
the principles set forth in Manson "require[d] the exclusion of an un-
corroborated personal identification, made only after hypnosis, of a
person clearly singled out for suspicion. 3 2 Thus, when hypnosis is
used as an identification tool in a criminal prosecution, the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant must be protected. Constitutional re-
quirements seem to demand at least some corroborating evidence of
the reliability of the identification procedure.
The problem of unreliability is compounded because memory re-
freshment by hypnosis tends to increase the witness' confidence in the
truth of the information he or she reveals.33 This effect, referred to as
memory "hardening, 3 4 creates special barriers to the court's truth-
seeking ability. The hypnotic procedure "can bolster a witness whose
credibility would easily have been destroyed by cross-examination but
who now becomes quite impervious to such efforts, repeating one par-
ticular version of his story with great conviction." 5 In this way, the
witness is made highly resistant to cross-examination. This raises yet
another constitutional problem, this time with the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment.16 As one commentator notes:
28. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972).
29. 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1981). For a general discussion of these cases and their relation to
posthypnotic testimony, see Falk, Posthypnotic Testimony-Witness Competency and the Ful-
crum of Procedural Safeguards, 57 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 30, 56-59 (1982) (arguing that minimal
procedural safeguards should prove sufficient to avoid denial of due process).
30. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
31. 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
32. Id. at 1203.
33. Diamond, supra note 23, at 339-40.
34. See Note, supra note 20, at 928.
35. Orne, supra note 21, at 332.
36. The sixth amendment grants the accused the "right ... to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him." U.S. CoNrsT. amend. VI.
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This false confidence may interfere with the jury's proper function in
evaluating the demeanor of a witness. Arguably, a defendant faced
with such a witness is denied his sixth amendment right to confront
his accusers because the witness' original memory is lost forever. The
defendant must now face a "new" witness whose natural recollection
may have been altered by suggestion or confabulation, but who
nonetheless has a firm conviction as to its truth.37
The Fourth Circuit considered this sixth amendment argument in
two recent cases. In Harker v. Maryland," the court found that cau-
tionary instructions apprising the jury of the potential dangers of hyp-
nosis, cross-examination and "full exploration of the hypnotic
event" 3 9 sufficiently alleviated the constitutional problem. Likewise,
in McQueen v. Garrison,40 the court found the corroborating evidence
presented sufficient to establish the reliability of the witness' testi-
mony and defeat the constitutional challenge.4'
Even more recently, the United States Supreme Court rejected an
argument that a simple loss of recollection creates a confrontation
clause violation when loss of recollection is so complete as to interfere
with effective cross-examination. In United States v. Owens,42 the
Court reiterated that the confrontation clause only guarantees "an op-
portunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish. '"43 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, continued that
the requirements of the clause would be satisfied if, on cross-examina-
tion, "the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as
37. Falk, supra note 29, at 53-54 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive
You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN
L. REv. 969, 988-1000 (1977).
38. 800 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986).
39. Id at 443.
40. 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 332 (1987).
41. Id. The court somewhat apologetically stated, "[n]o appellate court has gone ... so far
as to judge whether hypnotically enhanced testimony was free of the dangers associated with
hypnosis solely from a review of the witness' testimony." Id. at 960. Nonetheless, the court
proceeded to do just that, stating:
[The witness'] responses generally were not the automatic responses of a precondi-
tioned mental process ....
[The witness] exhibited reasoned judgment in these responses and her disagreements
with questioning counsel appear to be from independent reasoning . . . . In short, her
general testimony presents the appearance that she testified independent of possible
suggestion from the hypnotist and that her memory had not "hardened."
Id. at 960-61.
42. 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988).
43. Id. at 842 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1987); Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).
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the witness's bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight,
and even (what is often a prime objective of cross-examination) the
very fact that he has a bad memory."" Owens should not prove dis-
positive of this point in the hypnosis cases, however, for aside from
problems of unreliability, the memory hardening effects of hypnosis
may block this crucial inquiry into the veracity of a witness's testi-
mony.
The inherent unreliability of posthypnotic testimony, combined
with its potential interference with cross-examination, provides states
with a legitimate interest in regulating or restricting the admissibility
of such testimony. Many states accomplish this end by applying the
rule developed in Frye v. United States,45 which normally controls the
admissibility of unreliable scientific evidence such as polygraph re-
sults, truth serum interviews, blood typing, voiceprint analysis, and
the like. 46
44. Id. (citation omitted).
45. 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
46. The rule requires that in order for a scientific procedure to gain admissibility, "the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
The Frye rule has been widely criticized. McCormick commented that .'[g]eneral scientific
acceptance' is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion
for the admissibility of scientific evidence." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972).
Some argue that the test has been superseded, at least in the federal courts, by the more lenient
standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5168 (1978). A number of federal courts have followed this reasoning.
e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams,
583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v Bailer,
519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). This reasoning has also been
adopted by some states which have adopted rules identical to the relevant federal provisions.
See, e.g., State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 503-04 (Me. 1978).
Even if Frye remains applicable to scientific evidence, other commentators suggest that it
should not be applied to hypnosis.One writer's observations are worth quoting at length:
First, technically the test is not directly applicable because it is concerned with the
admissibility of expert opinion deduced from the results of a scientific technique, such
as a lie detector test, and not with the admissibility of eyewitness testimony. Second,
the Frye test often is interpreted as requiring that scientific techniques used to gather
evidence be infallible. It seems unjustified to apply such a strict standard to hypnoti-
cally influenced testimony when other kinds of eyewitness testimony, also frequently
unreliable, are not similarly scrutinized. . . .Third, because the Frye test focuses on
the general reliability of hypnosis, it obscures the equally important question whether
the technique is reliable in a given case. . . . A final problem with the Frye test is that
reliability should not be the sole criterion for admissibility. Even when testimony is
reliable, the benefits of admitting it may not outweigh the danger that the trier of fact
will attach undue weight to it.
Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Infuenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1217-18
(1981) (footnotes omitted). See also Comment, The Probative Value of Testimony from the
Hypnotically Refreshed Recollection, 14 AKRON L. REV. 609, 615 (1981).
The Supreme Court in Rock was not required to address the applicability of the Frye standard
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Despite acknowledged difficulties, a number of factors continue to
weigh in favor of the use of hypnosis as a device for refreshing mem-
ory. Recent research reveals that a number of problems associated
with posthypnotic-recall are not unique to the hypnotic process. 47 Post-
hypnotic unreliability and the effects of memory hardening are mag-
nified because the reliability and accuracy of eyewitness recall itself is
inherently suspect, a finding replicated in several contexts since the
earliest studies. 48 Like their hypnotized counterparts, unhypnotized
witnesses are also highly susceptible to the effects of suggestion and
confabulation. In efforts to fill incomplete or fragmentary memories,
witnesses have often been found to fabricate parts of a story to make
it appear more plausible. 49 Further, similar motivations can cause a
witness' confidence in such a memory to improve with time.5 0
Compounding these difficulties are the effects of post-event ques-
tioning. Even the most innocuous questions may produce profound
changes in the recall of the ordinary, unhypnotized witness. 1
In addition, pretrial preparation procedures have been recognized
as producing effects identical to posthypnotic memory hardening.12
Here, advocates often attempt to reshape a witness' testimony to fit
to posthypnotic testimony, since the Arkansas Supreme Court held that it would have excluded
Rock's testimony either under Frye or under more conventional evidentiary approaches. Rock v.
State, 288 Ark. 566, 570, 708 S.W.2d 78, 80 (1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987). However,
the holding of the Supreme Court has the effect of preventing the Frye standard from being
invoked to create a per se rule of exclusion where such a rule would prevent the defendant from
testifying on his or her own behalf. More generally, the Court's decision in Rock can also be
seen to suggest that a more lenient case-by-case determination is preferable to a per se rule. See
infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
47. See Note, supra note 20, at 932-33 ("Both the desire to please and confabulation, there-
fore, are not problems unique to the hypnotized subject."); Comment, Hypnosis-Should the
Courts Snap Out of It? A Closer Look at the Critical Issues, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1053, 1068-71
(1983); Note, Hypnotically Aided Testimony: The Abandonment of Frye, 2 REV. o LITIGATIO N
231, 235-38 (1982).
48. A broad overview of the relevant research can be found in L. TAYLOR, supra note 11, §
3-1, at 84-104.
49. Note, Hypnotically Aided Testimony: The Abandonment of Frye, 2 REV. OF LITIGATION
231, 237(1982).
50. Id.
51. See L. TAYLOR, supra note 11, § 3-2, at 110. The author provides an overview of the
studies performed by Elizabeth Loftus and others in the early 1970's, which tended to show that
even slight differences in the ways questions were posed produced large differences in the accu-
racy of the information recalled. For example, asking the question "How fast were the cars
traveling when they smashed into each other?" produced significantly higher estimates of speed
than the question "How fast were the cars traveling when they hit each other?" Id. In another
experiment, asking, "Did you see the broken headlight?" produced a higher number of affirma-
tive responses than asking, "Did you see a broken headlight?" Loftus, Reconstructing Memory,
The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1974, at 118.
52. See Note, supra note 20, at 933.
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the needs of a particular case. 3 Repeated rehearsal results, in many
cases, in a substitution of the attorney's words for those of the wit-
ness, and further, it "increases the likelihood that the witness' story
will become frozen in a fixed pattern. ' 5 4 In short, the problems pre-
sented by posthypnotic testimony are arguably identical to those pres-
ent in ordinary eyewitness recall, though to a different degree, since
the effects of hypnosis may compound an already unreliable eyewit-
ness account. These factors should be considered in determining
whether to exclude posthypnotic testimony, and if so, to what extent.
Accepting all its problems, the use of hypnosis for purposes of
memory enhancement has been instrumental in uncovering leads and
producing identifications.55 Experts describe hypnosis as "an efficient
and effective tool that is essential in saving valuable time, trimming
costs, and providing new leads in difficult cases." '5 6 A Los Angeles
Police Department study reveals that in a sampling of sixty-seven
criminal investigations in which hypnotism was involved, new infor-
mation believed otherwise unobtainable through ordinary interview
procedures was uncovered in seventy-seven percent of these cases.5 7 In
addition, hypnotic techniques have led to significant and somewhat
remarkable breakthroughs in several highly publicized cases.18 Such
results have led to the increased use of hypnosis by law enforcement
agencies, many of which now provide special training in hypnotic in-
duction techniques.5 9
53. Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concerning the Psychology of
Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 547, 554-56 (1984).
54. Id. at 555-56. The author noted that repeated pretrial contact:
substantially increase[s] the risk of testimonial distortion through the substitution of
the attorney's suggestions for the witness's perceptions. Once such a substitution has
taken place there is virtually no hope of retrieving the original perceptions. Second,
they may boost a witness's confidence in the accuracy of proffered testimony without
actually improving accuracy.
Id. (citations omitted).
55. L. TAY.OR, supra note 11, at 80.
56. W. HUBBARD & R. WARRING, FORENsIc HYPNOSIS 11-12 (1981), quoted in L. TAYLOR,
supra note 11, at 80.
57. Id.
58. One highly publicized example is the use of hypnosis in the "Cowchilla kidnapping"
case, the largest mass kidnapping in the history of the United States. Twenty-six students and a
bus driver were abducted by three masked gunmen, driven a hundred miles away, and buried
underground. After his escape, and after memory refreshment by hypnosis, the bus driver was
able to recall all but one of the numbers on the gunmen's license plate. L. TAYLOR, supra note
11, at 81-82.
59. See Note, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: In Support of the Emerging Majority and
People v. Hughes, 33 BuFF. L. REv. 417 & n.1 (1984). See also Note, supra note 20, at 935; Sies
& Wester, supra note 12, at 84.
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B. Judicial Approaches to Hypnotically Influenced Testimony
The popularity of hypnosis as an investigative tool, coupled with
the somewhat erratic ways in which the state courts deal with the
question of admissibility, creates special problems for prosecutor and
defense counsel alike. They are frequently forced to gamble that cru-
cial testimony will be excluded, in whole or part. 60 After two decades
of consideration, state courts have fashioned fundamentally conflict-
ing ways of treating the problem. These approaches range from un-
conditional admissibility to unconditional inadmissibility, with
compromise positions advocating case-by-case analysis. What follows
is a brief overview of the four most prevalent approaches. 61
1. The Admissibility Approach: Harding v. State
Perhaps the earliest systematic approach was developed by the Mary-
land court in Harding v. State.62 The court in Harding treated post-
hypnotic testimony not as the product of a scientific technique, but as
ordinary eyewitness testimony, refreshed in a way similar to showing
the witness a written memorandum. As such, it was unconditionally
admissible. The court reasoned that since the witness was reciting
facts from the witness stand from present recollection, the testimony
should be admitted. 63 The court also noted that the witness' testimony
was corroborated by the existence of external evidence, 64 and that the
jury was specially instructed that the testimony should be given no
more weight than normal recall. 65
A number of courts quickly followed the Harding approach. The
Harding admissibility standard was adopted by several federal circuits
including the Ninth, initially for civil, 66 then for criminal 67 cases, and
the Fifth. 68
60. See Note, People v. Shirley: An Unwarranted Per Se Exclusion of Hypnotically En-
hanced Testimony?, 14 Sw. U.L. REV. 777, 821 (1984).
61. This review is by no means intended to be comprehensive. Relevant decisions are too
numerous and varied to allow for complete development here. Neither are the four approaches
discussed within the only options available. A number of courts have developed their own hybrid
approaches for dealing with hypnotically-refreshed testimony. My intention in the section which
follows is only to familiarize the reader with the fundamentals of the various approaches, in
order to clarify the issues at stake in Rock.
62. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
63. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
64. Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312.
65. Id. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
66. Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Kline v. Ford Motor
Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975).
67. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
Though the opinion is frequently quoted for the proposition that "the fact of hypnosis affects
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Despite Harding's initial popularity, courts and commentators be-
gan to take note of some of the problems inherent in the uncondi-
tional admissibility of posthypnotic testimony. One of the greatest
concerns was that the assessment of reliability was left entirely to ju-
rors, who might grant undue weight to posthypnotic testimony due to
the "aura of reliability" surrounding the technique.6 9 While this could
be corrected to some degree with cautionary instructions, commenta-
tors also noted that "[i]n allowing the testimony of all previously hyp-
notized witnesses to reach the trier of fact, the court does not bar
evidence made unreliable by undue suggestiveness." 7 0 Additionally,
the approach offered no incentive to law enforcement officials and
agencies to follow procedures which minimized the danger of unrelia-
ble recall. 71 Such concerns eventually resulted in the express overruling
of Harding.7 2 In an attempt to remedy these weaknesses, yet retain the
potentially valuable information uncovered through hypnosis, some
courts have looked toward regulating and standardizing the proce-
dure.
2. The Conditional Admissibility Approach: Procedural
Safeguards and State v. Hurd
In United States v. Adams," the Ninth Circuit strongly recom-
mended the adoption of minimal procedural safeguards in order to
reduce the likelihood of admitting testimony unduly influenced by the
suggestiveness of the hypnotist. The court recommended retaining a
complete record of the hypnotic interview, preferably on audio or vid-
credibility, but not admissibility," the court strongly recommended the adoption of procedural
safeguards to help insure reliability. Id. See also Note, supra note 60, at 790-91, wherein the
author observes:
With near unanimity in the decade following Harding, courts admitted hypnotically
adduced testimony on a per se basis on the theory that the traditional adversarial de-
vices such as cross-examination of the witness, judicial discretion regarding expert
qualifications, expert testimony on the effects of hypnosis upon memory recall, and
the availability of limiting instructions to the jury allowed the trier of fact to accord
proper weight to the testimony offered as evidence at trial.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
68. Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circuit now seems to favor
a balancing approach to the problem. See Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1701 (5th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 136-43 and accom-
panying text for discussions of these cases.
69. See Note, supra note 20, at 939.
70. Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 117.
71. Id. at 118.
72. Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 205, 447 A.2d 1272, 1283 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982),
aff'd, State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
73. 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
19881
196 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:185
eotape, and suggested that the session be conducted by a qualified
hypnotist. 74 In 1981, the Supreme Court of New Jersey took the sug-
gestion to heart, and in State v. HurdP5 affirmed various rules of con-
ditional admissibility based on compliance with specific procedural
safeguards .76
The court in Hurd first required a determination that the memory
loss at issue was appropriate for the use of hypnosis. Once that deter-
mination was made, the court then looked to ensure that procedural
safeguards were followed. 77 The court adopted the following six pro-
cedural safeguards, which were based upon the expert testimony of
Dr. Martin Orne:78
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis.
(2) The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session
should be independent of and not responsible to the prosecutor,
investigator or the defense.
(3) Any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement
personnel prior to the hypnotic session must be in written form so
that subsequently the extent of the information the subject may have
received from the hypnotist may be determined.
(4) Before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain
from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject
remembers them, carefully avoiding adding any new elements to the
witness' decription of the events.
(5) All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be
recorded so that a permanent record is available for comparison and
study to establish that the witness has not received information or
suggestion which might later be reported as having been first
described by the subject during hypnosis. Videotape should be
employed if possible, but should not be mandatory.
(6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during
any phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing
and post-hypnotic interview. 79
74. Id. at 199 nn. 12-13.
75. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
76. Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
77. Id.
78. Ironically, Dr. Orne is perhaps the most vocal proponent of making posthypnotic testi-
mony inadmissible per se. His admonishments are cited and relied upon by most courts adopting
the per se approach. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); People v. Shirley,
31 Cal. 3d 18, 62-66 & nn.43-51, 723 P.2d 1354, 1381-83 & nn.43-51, 181 Cal Rptr. 243, 270-72
& nn. 43-51, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). See generally Orne, supra note 21.
79. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 533, 432 A.2d at 90-91.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted these standards through
a unique application of the Frye test.80 Rather than requiring that hyp-
nosis be generally accepted as a reliable means of achieving absolutely
accurate recall, the court settled, on a less stringent interpretation of
the Frye standard. Recognizing that even normal eyewitness recall is
"often historically inaccurate," ' 8' the court ruled that "testimony en-
hanced through hypnosis is admissible in a criminal trial if the trial
court finds that the use of hypnosis in the particular case was reasona-
bly likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to normal human
memory. "82 Further, in order to provide a standard of reliability, the
court adopted the safeguards developed in the lower court, and placed
the burden of establishing compliance upon the proponent of the evi-
dence.8 3
Since Hurd, a number of courts have adopted various formulations
and combinations of procedural safeguards, while applying or refus-
ing to apply the Frye standard in its various forms. 84 Though varied
and perhaps confusing, these solutions share a number of common
assumptions. Among them are "an aversion to the exclusion of rele-
vant evidence, a recognition of the risks of hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony, and a belief that procedural safeguards ...can minimize or
negate those risks." 85
These approaches are not without their flaws, however. One com-
mentator declares that the reliability of posthypnotic testimony cannot
be guaranteed, even with the use of procedural safeguards. 6 The
Hurd standard is also difficult to apply. Courts have experienced dif-
ficulty comparing recollections of a witness once hypnotized to what
would be the recollections of an "ordinary" witness.8 7 In addition,
courts look skeptically at the administrative difficulties created by a
case-by-case approach.8 These and similar concerns have prompted
courts to seek a general rule regarding admissibility, one which re-
sults, somewhat ironically, in complete inadmissibility.
80. For a general discussion of the more traditional applications of the Frye standard, see
supra note 46.
81. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92.
82. Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
83. Id. at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97. See also Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 101.
84. See Sies & Wester, supra note 12,. at 102-13 & nn.156-64.
85. Id. at 103.
86. Diamond, supra note 23, at 314.
87. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 214-15, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981).
88. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
255, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
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3. The Inadmissibility Approach: State v. Mack, People v.
Shirley, and Progeny
Today the view among most states is one of inadmissibility.8 9
Courts adopting this approach liken posthypnotic testimony to the
product of a scientific experiment, rather than to an identification
procedure, or to memoranda used to refresh a witness' memory. 9° The
appropriate test of admissibility, they therefore hold, is the same used
for other forms of scientific evidence, i.e., the Frye rule. Again, the
Frye rule requires not that the technique prove reliable in a particular
case, but that it gain general acceptance in the scientific community. 9'
The inadmissibility approach appears to be a reaction to modern
theories of memory which hold that the process of retrieval is a con-
structive, as opposed to a reproductive process. 92 It is the prospect of
hypnosis actively altering recollection, then, that provides the theoreti-
cal motivation behind per se exclusion, and the application of the Frye
standard to eyewitness recall. One commentator summarizes the rea-
soning of these courts:
The recognition that hypnosis is not merely a retrieval mechanism
for lost memories, but is an active agent in the reconstruction of
memory has led to a rejection of the Harding and Hurd approaches
on several grounds. Courts have recognized that the technique of
hypnosis is scientific and the testimony of the witness is the direct
product of the technique. Because the testimony is therefore only as
reliable as the hypnotic process that produced it, both the testimony
and the scientific procedure must be judged by the same legal
standard of Frye v. United States. Consequently, because hypnosis
does not merely retrieve memories, but also produces them, the Frye
test for admissibility can only be met if the scientific technique,
hypnosis, and its product, memory, are both reliably accurate. 93
89. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206, at'633 (3d ed. 1984). Sies and Wester note that be-
tween 1980 and 1985, "a per se rule of inadmissibility was adopted by the high courts in more
than a dozen states and by lower appellate courts in several other states." See Sies & Wester,
supra note 12, at 103-04.
90. Note, supra note 20, at 944.
91. For a detailed discussion of the Frye rule and its applicability to posthypnotic testi-
mony, see supra note 46.
92. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 57-62, 723 P.2d 1354, 1378-79, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
266-70, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). Years ago, Sir Frederick Bartlett concluded that "the
first notion to get rid of is that memory is primarily or literally reduplicative, or reproduc-
tive .... In fact, if we consider evidence rather than presupposition, remembering appears to be
far more decisively an affair of construction rather than one of mere reproduction." F. BART-
LETI, REmEmEERING 204-05 (1932). This early conclusion has been reaffirmed time and again by
modern experiments, led by the pioneering efforts of Elizabeth Loftus. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
93. Mickenberg, Mesmerizing Justice: The Use of Hypnotically-Induced Testimony in
Criminal Trials, 34 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 927, 966 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
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State v. Mack 94 is the case credited with leading this bold departure
from Harding and a rule of unconditional admissibility. 95 In consider-
ing the issue of admissibility, the court in Mack heard the extensive
testimony of several experts, including Dr. Orne. The complexity of
considering such testimony formed the basis for the court's conclusion
that "a case-by-case decision on the admissibility question would be
prohibitively expensive."96 The court looked to the Frye rule for assis-
tance in developing a per se approach. Though realizing that the testi-
mony of previously hypnotized witnesses was not strictly analogous to
more conventional applications of Frye in determining the reliability
of various forms of mechanical testing, the court concluded that "the
Frye rule is equally applicable in this context, where the best expert
testimony indicates that no expert can determine whether memory re-
trieved by hypnosis, or any part of that memory, is truth, falsehood,
or confabulation." 91 Emphasizing the unreliability of the technique,
the suspicious circumstances surrounding its application, and a com-
plete lack of corroboration of the victim's testimony, the court held it
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. 98
In the year-and-a-half following the Mack decision, five states
adopted per se inadmissibility. 99 All of these courts used some form of
the Frye test, and all found posthypnotic testimony inadmissible per
se, "effectively render[ing] the witness incompetent" to testify.'°°
The initial per se rule was one of complete incompetency, which
held the witness' testimony inadmissible "from the time of the hyp-
notic session forward."'' This rule proved unduly harsh, however, as
it required state officials to choose between preserving the testimony
of the witness for use at trial, or taking immediate advantage of hyp-
nosis in order to gain additional investigative information. 0 2 In an at-
tempt to lessen the severity of the per se approach, courts in several
states adopting the rule modified their opinions to allow witnesses to
94. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
95. See Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 104; Note, supra note 60, at 800.
96. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 766.
97. Id. at 768.
98. Id. at 772.
99. Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 105. The authors cite decisions from the high courts of
Arizona: State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); California: People v. Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); Michigan:
People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); Nebraska: State v. Palmer, 210
Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 206 (1987); Pennsylvania: Common-
wealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
100. Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 105-06.
101. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981) (footnote omitted).
102. Seeid. at232n.1, 624P.2dat 1280n.1.
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testify regarding information recalled prior to hypnosis. 03 California
remains the only jurisdiction which continues to preclude the admis-
sion of all posthypnotic testimony, including testimony consistent
with a witness' prehypnotic recollections. 104
The case which created California's harsh approach is People v.
Shirley.03 The ruling in Shirley permits a witness, once hypnotized, to
testify only to matters "wholly unrelated to the events that were the
subject of the hypnotic session."' 16 Though criminal defendants were
originally held to this rule, a necessary exception for them was created
three months after the issuance of the original Shirley opinion. 0 7 The
exemption was created only for the defendant (not for the defendant's
witnesses) in.order to "avoid impairing the fundamental right of an
accused to testify in his own behalf." 108
The Shirley approach has been harshly criticized. 109 The Shirley rule
is overinclusive in that it renders even prehypnotic recall inadmissible,
even in the event that it is corroborated by independent evidence." 0
Further, its application of the Frye test has been criticized as a self-
serving rationalization invoked for the purposes of justifying the
court's conclusions regarding admissibility."' Application of the Frye
test by the court in Shirley requires that the technique of hypnosis be
"almost infallible"' 2 as a means for producing "historically accurate
memory."" 3 This application fails to recognize, as the court recog-
nized in Hurd, that even normal eyewitness recall can be unreliable,
and probably could not pass Shirley's stringent standards. Instead, the
proper standard should consider, as stated in Hurd, "whether hypno-
sis is generally accepted as a 'reliable means of restoring memory com-
parable to normal recall.'""' 4
Even in its more lenient forms, the per se approach has been
roundly criticized. While applying Frye in order to develop a per se
103. Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 108.
104. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 12- 4, at 357.
105. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
106. Id. at 67, 723 P.2d at 1384, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citations omitted). See also Note, supra note 60, at 807.
109. People v. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 926, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 500-01 (1982)
(Gardner, J., concurring) ("Shirley is really more of a polemic than an opinion. As a polemic it
makes.interesting reading.'); Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 103 (per se rule of inadmissibility
is a "draconian device").
110. See Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 75, 723 P.2d at 1389, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (Kaus, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
111. See Note, supra note 60, at 809-11.
112. Id.
113. Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 112.
114. Id. at 111 (quoting State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 528, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981)).
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rule leaves determinations of reliability to experts rather than ju-
rors," it does so "without more carefully considering the varied con-
texts in which hypnosis may take place and the many factors which
may affect both the potential danger and the potential utility of hyp-
nosis in a particular instance." 116
Courts originally settled upon a per se approach for the purpose of
promoting consistency of decision. Application of the Frye standard,
however, has not produced uniformity. Inconsistency exists in both
application and result," 7 prompting critics to implicate the Frye stan-
dard "as a label to justify [judges'] own views about the reliability of
particular forensic techniques.""' Thus commentators plead loudly
for a principled alternative:
A better approach would require judges to cease hiding behind the
mask of the Frye reliability test and openly expose and clearly
articulate their true reasons for rejecting hypnotically refreshed
testimony so that their concerns may be adequately debated and
evaluated. Such debate is foreclosed and justice is impaired by the
expedient employment of an inappropriate standard that may result
in an automatic and overly broad exclusion of relevant evidence." 9
4. The Balancing Approach: Probative and Prejudicial Value
One emerging approach, the seeming favorite of writers on the sub-
ject, 20 embraces one of the broad policies 2 ' embodied in the Federal
115. Note, supra note 20, at 945.
116. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 74, 723 P.2d at 1388, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78 (Kaus, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
117. Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at'116.
118. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 CoLtrM. L. REV. 1197, 1221 (1980).
119. Sies & Wester, supra note 12, at 116 (footnote omitted).
120. Id. at 120-23; Note, supra note 20, at 954-61; Note, supra note 49, at 253-54. Note,
Awakening From the Exclusionary Trance: A Balancing Approach to the Admissibility of Hyp-
notically Refreshed Testimony, 61 TEx. L. Rav. 719, 730-35 (1982); Note, The Admissibility of
Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REv. 1203, 1220-23 (1981).
121. Whether the Federal Rules effectively supplanted the Frye standard in the federal courts
and in states adopting identical or similar rules is unsettled. The Supreme Court in Rock was not
compelled to address the issue since the Supreme Court of Arkansas declared that Rock's testi-
mony would have been inadmissible under either the Frye standard or under more traditional
evidentiary approaches. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
Other federal courts faced with the confrontation between Frye and the Federal Rules have
found delicate ways around it. See, e.g. Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112,
1122 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 1046 (1986); United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196,
1200-01 (5th Cir. 1984). However, some earlier decisions suggest that the applicability of Frye is
greatly limited following the enactment of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., United States v. Wil-
liams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197- 98, 1200 & n. 11 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
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Rules of Evidence. 1'2 "Modern evidence law favors admissibility" by,
for example, eliminating outmoded doctrines of exclusion and incom-
petency, and by expanding the definition of relevancy . 3 However,
some important restrictions remain. Sometimes described as 'the
cornerstone' of the Federal Rules,' 12 4 Rule 403 enunciates one funda-
mental restriction:
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice,
Confusion, or Waste of Time. Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. 2
The rationale of the balancing approach is straightforward. It be-
gins with Rule 601, the general competency provision, which holds
every person "competent to be a witness," except as otherwise pro-
vided in the Federal Rules, or, where applicable, by relevant state
law. 26 It is then left for the judge to apply Rule 403 as needed to
promote accuracy of the proceeding and fairness to the parties.127 One
obvious advantage is that the standard is necessarily applied on a case-
by-case basis, effectively avoiding any injustice done by a per se
122. The three "entrenched" positions, the admissibility approach, the procedural safe-
guards approach, and per se exclusion only implicitly recognize the relevance of various federal
rules which seem to justify, or at least permit their respective conclusions. One commentator
explains:
The credibility position implicitly applies Federal Rule of Evidence 104(e) and allows
the jury to hear evidence relevant to weight or credibility. Federal Rule of Evidence
104(b) applies to relevancy conditional on fulfillment of a fact, and the procedural
safeguards position follows this rule. Under this position, the judge makes a prelimi-
nary finding whether the foundation evidence- here the required procedures- sup-
ports a finding of relevance. Following this finding, the jury makes the final
conclusion on the issue of relevancy.
The general acceptance position [the per se approach], on the other hand, considers
hypnotically refreshed testimony as either a question of witness qualification or of
admissibility of evidence. The court essentially decides the question, therefore, under
Rule 104(a). . . .Although courts do not refer specifically to the rules of evidence
when invoking any of these three positions, courts have followed the theories underly-
ing the rules.
Note, supra note 20, at 948 n.186.
123. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial
Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 497 (1983).
124. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Peterfreund, Relevance and its Limits in the Proposed
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts: Article IV, 25 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 80,
83 (1970)).
125. FED. R. EvID. 403.
126. FED. R. Evm. 601.
127. See Gold, supra note 123, at 499.
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rule. "'28 Another advantage is the flexibility inherent in the approach.
The rule allows the court to place on the same "scale" such diverse
factors as the circumstances of the hypnotic procedure itself, the rele-
vancy and importance of the testimony, and external indicia of relia-
bility such as the quantity and quality of corroborative evidence.
The flexibility of the rule is apparent from its wording. It permits
the exclusion of evidence when the probative value of that evidence is
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.' 1 29
While traditionally construed to hold inadmissible, for example, evi-
dence of prejudicial characteristics of an individual defendant, 30 or
photographic evidence which tends to elicit a juror's emotional rather
than rational faculties,' the standard naturally encompasses the un-
fairly prejudicial effects created in the minds of jurors confronted
with a hypnotically refreshed witness. Likewise, the clause requiring
the scrutiny of evidence tending to mislead the jury, including evi-
dence which is "seductively persuasive," 3 2 provides a natural context
in which to consider the alleged aura of credibility surrounding the
hypnotic process.'33
While the balancing approach seems preferable to per se approaches
by virtue of its flexibility, this same flexibility is also its major weak-
ness. Lacking concrete guidelines, the approach suffers from a lack of
uniform application. 3 4 For this reason, courts have tended to create in
application a hybrid approach, demanding compliance with proce-
dural safeguards from the Hurd line of cases, and considering the de-
gree of compliance with these factors as one criterion in toward
estimating potential prejudicial effect. Toward this end, courts have
128. See Note, supra note 20, at 951.
129. FED. R. EviD. 403.
130. Past history of crime or drunkenness, or association with unpopular political organiza-
tions thus are typically inadmissible. See Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S.
CAL. L. REv. 220, 238-39 (1976).
131. Id. at 239.
132. Id. at 242.
133. Earliest studies tended to show that results of unreliable scientific techniques, more spe-
cifically, polygraph tests, had an unduly prejudical effect on jurors if admitted into evidence.
Later studies discredited the conclusions drawn from the earlier studies, showing that juries
maintained an ability to critically evaluate such evidence. For an excellent review of the relevant
research, see Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical
Evaluation, 74 Gao. L.J. 1769 (1986).
More important for purposes here, these later studies also showed that a judge's cautionary
instructions proved generally effective in combatting any undue prejudicial effects, and an ex-
pert's cautionary testimony proved even more effective, '"completely eliminat[ing] the effect of
the polygraph evidence' in how the jurors perceived the defendant's guilt." Id. at 1791 (quoting
Cavoukian & Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Court: Some Empirical
Findings, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117, 128 (1980)).
134. Note, supra note 20, at 952.
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created a two prong analysis, where the first prong tests reliability by
evaluating compliance with the guidelines, and the second prong bal-
ances probative value against prejudicial effect.'35 These cases also re-
veal several factors which can assist in achieving a consistent and fair
approach to the problem.
A number of these considerations have taken root in the federal
circuits. In United States v. Valdez, 36 the Fifth Circuit reversed the
conviction of a defendant charged with extortion, after he had been
identified by a Texas Ranger following hypnotic memory refreshment.
The court articulated the balancing rule, stating "[w]e therefore exam-
ine whether the probative value of this hypnotically influenced testi-
mony was outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, jury
confusion, or jury misapprehension,' '3 7 but did not follow it. Instead,
the court retreated to the equivalent of a per se rule, declaring that
when, as in the case before it, a hypnotized subject identifies a person
for the first time after learning that the individual is under suspicion,
the subject's testimony would be inadmissible "whatever procedural
safeguards were used to attempt to sanitize the hypnotic session."' 38
The Fifth Circuit continued to refine its balancing approach.3 9 In
Wicker v. McCotter,'40 the court applied the balancing rule, 4' and up-
held a lower court decision admitting posthypnotic testimony. The
court compared the witness' posthypnotic testimony to her written
statement given before the hypnotic session, and found that they
"corresponded substantially."'' 42 In rejecting the defendant's charge
of error, the court also noted "substantial independent evidence" of
the witness' refreshed testimony and its agreement with testimony of an
unhypnotized witness. 43
135. This is precisely the conclusion reached by commentators as well. See Sies & Wester,
supra note 12, at 120-21; Note, supra note 20, at 952-61.
136. 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
137. Id. at 1201.
138. Id. at 1203.
139. But see United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908
(1985). Here the court did not expressly adopt the balancing approach, instead distinguishing the
case sub judice from "the exclusionary rule formulated in Valdez " on particular facts. The
court in Harrelson characterized procedural irregularities in Valdez as "unduly suggestive," but
found that in the instant case, the hypnosis was conducted with "care and circumspection." Id.
at 1180.
140. 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3310 (1986).
141. "The admissibility of [posthypnotic] testimony is to be evaluated on a case by case
basis. The probative value of the testimony is to be weighed against its possible prejudicial
effect." Id. at 492.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit applied a near equivalent of the Rule 403 bal-
ancing test in determining whether admission of posthypnotic testi-
mony affected "a substantial right of the party" in accord with Rule
103(a).' In one recent case,' 45 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a ruling
admitting the posthypnotic testimony of a witness largely because
"the [trial] court found that the attempt to enhance [the witness']
memory was, quite simply, unsuccessful."' 146 Under similar circum-
stances, the court held likewise 47 after considering 1) the "strength of
proof" other than the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses, 2) the
lack of effect of hypnosis on a witness revealing particularly impor-
tant information, 3) the apparent failure of the hypnotic procedure to
enhance the witnesses' memory, 4) the testimony consistent with pre-
hypnotic statements, and 5) the probability of reaching the same ver-
dict had the witness been limited to prehypnotic recall. 48
A number of factors are considered under the balancing approach,
including, but not limited to, relative compliance with procedural
safeguards, the value of corroborative evidence (including corrobora-
tive testimony by nonhypnotized witnesses), and the degree to which
posthypnotic differs from prehypnotic recall. Further, the balancing
approach can well accomodate the criminal defendant's constitutional
rights. This last consideration is particularly important in light of the
reasoning of the Rock decision.
II. ROCK V. ARKANSAS
Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for her role in the
death of her husband. 49 While preparing her defense, Rock was un-
able to recall important details surrounding the shooting incident.
Consequently her defense counsel arranged for Rock to undergo
memory refreshment by hypnosis. Rock twice underwent hypnosis
with a licensed neuropsychologist, Dr. Bettye Back, who initially in-
terviewed the defendant for one hour prior to the first hypnotic ses-
sion.'50 Though Dr. Back tape recorded the hypnotic sessions, she
144. FED. R. Evm. 103(a).
145. United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1183
(1986).
146. Id. at 704. Though the court did not explicitly follow a balancing rule, it seemed to
require one in holding that the district court "did not abuse its discretion in admitting the [wit-
ness'] testimony." Id. at 705.
147. See United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3270 (1987).
148. Id. at 223.
149. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2706 (1987).
150. Id.
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took only handwritten notes of the prehypnotic interview. 5 , Rock did
not recall any additional information while under hypnosis. After the
hypnotic interview, however, she did recall that just prior to the
shooting her finger had not been on the trigger of the gun, and that
the gun had discharged when her husband grabbed her arm. 15 2 Her
testimony was later corroborated by a gun expert, who testified that
the weapon was defective and prone to discharge when hit or
dropped.'
The prosecution, upon learning of the hypnotic sessions, filed a mo-
tion to exclude the defendant's testimony. A separate pretrial hearing
was held on the issue of admissibility, and the prosecution's motion
was granted. 15 4 The defendant was ordered to testify only to 'matters
remembered and stated to the examiner prior to being placed under
hypnosis."" 5 5
At the trial the defendant was examined directly from a copy of Dr.
Back's notes, and was held closely to their contents. 5 6 The defendant
was neither permitted to relate to the jury facts recalled after hypno-
sis, nor those previously recalled but not recorded by Dr. Back. 5 7
Vickie Rock was convicted of manslaughter, sentenced to ten years in
prison, and fined $10,000.18
A. The Supreme Court of Arkansas: Rock v. State
Before the Arkansas Supreme Court on appeal, 5 9 the appellant ar-
gued that the posthypnotic testimony should have been admitted and
151. Id. This point would later prove crucial, as the trial court would hold the defendant's
posthypnotic testimony inadmissible. Insofar as her testimony pertained to the events surround-
ing the shooting, Rock was only permitted to testify as to the information recorded during this
prehypnotic interview. Id. at 2707.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. The complete pretrial order is reprinted in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The
pertinent provisions read:
Defendant cannot be prevented by the Court from testifying at her trial on criminal
charges under the Arkansas Constitution, but testimony of matters recalled by Defen-
dant due to hypnosis will be excluded because of inherent unreliability and the effect
of hypnosis in eliminating any meaningful cross-examination on those matters. Defen-
dant may testify to matters remembered and stated to the examiner prior to being
placed under hypnosis. Testimony resulting from post-hypnotic suggestion will be
excluded.
Id. at 2707 n.3.
158. Id. at 2707.
159. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78 (1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
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that the trial court's order was unduly restrictive.160 In addition, the
appellant argued that excluding her posthypnotic testimony violated
her constitutional right to testify in her own behalf.1 61
The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that the "more recent
trend is toward exclusion of such testimony' '1 62 and adopted per se
exclusion. Interestingly, in reaching its decision, the court neither es-
tablished the Frye test nor the traditional balancing approach as a ba-
sis for its rule of per se inadmissibility. The court stated, "[s]ome
critics contend that Frye is too strict and will exclude helpful and pro-
bative evidence. We do not have to resolve that issue in this case, as
we would find the hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible by
either the Frye test, or some form of it, or by traditional evidentiary
concepts. "163
Committing itself to neither standard, the court proceeded to apply
both. The court first found, citing Shirley and its progeny, and the
usual expert sources, that hypnosis "has not gained general accep-
tance as a means of ascertaining truth in the field of forensic law."'64
The court also concluded, alluding to the balancing approach, that
"[m]uch more could be said on the subject of hypnotically induced
recollection, but we are satisfied from the more recent cases and the
views of experts, that the dangers of admitting this kind of testimony
outweigh whatever probative value it may have."'' 65 This statement
shows that the court severely misconstrued the balancing test. In stat-
ing this conclusion as a general rule, the court failed to recognize that
the balancing approach demands case-by-case consideration of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the hypnotic session and the probative value
of the individual witness' excluded testimony. 6  By ignoring these de-
tails and instead using the language of the balancing approach only to
160. Id. at 568, 708 S.W.2d at 79.
161. Id. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 84.
162. Id. at 569, 708 S.W.2d at 80.
163. Id. (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 570, 708 S.W.2d at 80.
165. Id. at 573, 708 S.W.2d at 81.
166. In Rock, application of the balancing approach would have required an estimation of
the probative value of the defendant's testimony and of the possible prejudicial effect of the
testimony on the jurors, and, of course, a weighing of their relative values. In the Rock case, the
probative value of the testimony should have rated very high, because Rock's later testimony
was independently corroborated by the gun expert, who testified that the gun was prone to dis-
charge when hit or dropped. As for the prejudicial effect of the defendant's testimony, while the
trial court acknowledged that Dr. Back's procedure did not fully comport with the guidelines
established in Hurd, the court did not pursue further analysis. See Rock, 288 Ark. at 573-74, 708
S.W.2d at 81-82. As was later noted by the Supreme Court, however, certain minimal procedural
requirements had been met. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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justify its per se rule, the court failed to recognize the principle advan-
tage of the balancing approach-its flexibility.
Responding to the claim that the trial court's limitations of the de-
fendant's testimony were too restrictive, the court once again bor-
rowed from the foundation laid by Shirley. The court noted that the
California Supreme Court had held a witness incompetent to testify
"on matters dealt with while under hypnosis" because the "likelihood
of contamination was deemed so pronounced.' 1 67 In so noting, the
court justified placing the burden "on [the] appellant to establish a
reliable record of the testimony. She cannot now claim error because
the court restricted her to the record she offered.'1 68
The court likewise dismissed the Constitutional challenge in short or-
der. Appellant Rock argued that restrictions placed on her testimony by
the pretrial order effectively violated her right to testify on her own
behalf,169 relying primarily on Chambers v. Mississippi. 70 In Chambers,
the defendant was charged with the murder of a policeman, despite the
fact that another man had repeatedly confessed his guilt to friends and
to Chambers' counsel.' 7' Testimony regarding these confessions was ul-
timately excluded through a strict application of various172 state eviden-
tiary rules, and news of the confessions never reached the jury. Justice
Powell, writing for the Supreme Court, reversed the Mississippi Su-
preme Court, holding, in an oft-quoted passage:
[tihe testimony rejected by the trial court have bore persuasive
assurances of trustworthiness .... That testimony was also critical to
Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the
167. Rock, 288 Ark. at 576, 708 S.W.2d at 83.
168. Id. at 577, 708 S.W.2d at 84.
169. Id. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 84. While the Petitioner did not provide explicit sources for
this right in her argument, the Supreme Court would later find support for such a right in the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process, the compulsory process clause of the sixth
amendment, and the fifth amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony. Rock v. Arkan-
sas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2709-11 (1987).
170. 410 U.S 284 (1973). A more elaborate treatment of the Chambers case is contained in
the opinion of the Supreme Court in Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711. The Chambers case, and the role
it plays in the theories supporting a general "right to present a defense," are discussed exten-
sively in Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. Rav. 711, 783 (1976). See also Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 151 (1974).
171. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 289.
172. Id. at 295-303. Chambers was prohibited from introducing the testimony of acquain-
tances and counsel who were privy to the confessions by application of state hearsay rules. He
was likewise prohibited from cross-examining the confessor by the state "voucher" rule which
prohibited the cross-examination of any witness not properly "adverse" to the defendant. Id.
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hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice. 17 1
The Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected the argument that the ex-
clusion of Rock's testimony was a similarly unconstitutional applica-
tion of state evidentiary law. Although the court recognized the right
to testify on one's own behalf as "fundamental," the court declared
that the right still remains "subject to the rules of procedure and evi-
dence, such as hearsay, or other instances of evidentiary exclusion
"'174 In distinguishing Rock from Chambers, the court cited Green-
field v. Robinson,175 a federal district court case which rejected a simi-
lar challenge to the exclusion of the defendant's hypnotic testimony.
The court also cited State v. Atwood, 76 a state appellate court opin-
ion, which rejected a similar challenge by refusing to "'accept evi-
dence of uncertain value . . . that is otherwise completely
uncorroborated.'"1 77
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 78 The peti-
tioner's brief first presented the argument that the exclusionary order
placed an unconstitutional restriction on Vickie Rock's right to testify
in her own defense. The argument stressed the importance of the ex-
cluded testimony, and established that defense counsel could not have
been put on notice that the defendant's testimony may have been ex-
cluded, since no rule of evidence, and no Arkansas decision addressed
the possibility of excluding such testimony. 179
173. Id. at 302.
174. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 578, 708 S.W.2d 78, 85, (1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 2704
(1987).
175. Id. (citing Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (W.D. Va. 1976)).
176. State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (Super. Ct. 1984).
177. Id. at 279, 479 A.2d at 264 (quoting Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120
(W.D. Va. 1976)). The Supreme Court of Arkansas justified its holding similarly as follows:
Chambers primarily found a hearsay exception for evidence offered by the defense
because of reliability. The Greenfield court pointed out it was excluding the hypnoti-
cally induced testimony for the very reason that it was unreliable, after reviewing ex-
pert opinion on the issue[.] ...
We think the same reasoning applies here. Appellant's testimony was restricted only
by what, in effect, are standard rules of evidence. The probative value of the prof-
fered testimony is questionable, as we have seen, but in any case, it is substantially
outweighed by the other considerations discussed.
We think the trial court took the proper course in its ruling and any prejudice or
deprivation caused to appellant in this case was minimal and resulted from her own
actions and not by any erroneous ruling of the court. We can find no violation of her
constitutional rights.
Rock, 288 Ark. at 578-80, 708 S.W.2d at 85-86.
178. 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986).
179. Brief for Petitioner at 6-14, Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987) (No. 86-130).
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The petitioner distinguished her case from the cases "relied upon
most heavily" by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The holding in At-
wood, the petitioner argued, was based on a misunderstanding of the
Greenfield case, in which the defendant sought to testify while either
under the effects of hypnosis, or alternatively, to have statements re-
corded during the hypnotic session admitted into evidence.8 0 The
cited cases were distinguishable because Vickie Rock sought only to
testify following memory refreshment by hypnosis.
Most importantly, the petitioner effectively distinguished People v.
Shirley8' in noting that the Shirley holding and its per se rule pertain
only to a prospective witness, not to a defendant. 8 2 In one of the ma-
jor articles upon which the Shirley holding was based, the author,
noted professor of both law and psychiatry Bernard L. Diamond, ex-
pressly withheld comment on the legal issue of the exclusion of a de-
fendant's posthypnotic testimony.'83 Most strikingly, the petitioner
noted that the court in Shirley expressly limited its per se exclusionary
rule as follows:
Second, when it is the defendant himself-not merely a defense
witness-who submits to pre-trial hypnosis, the experience will not
render his testimony inadmissible if he elects to take the stand. In
that case, the rule we adopt herein is subject to a necessary exception
to avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused to testify in
his own behalf. 8 4
The Supreme Court's opinion in Rock reaffirms that this is a neces-
sary exception, and establishes a solid foundation for the defendant's
right to testify.
B. The United States Supreme Court: Rock v. Arkansas
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas, and remanded the case to that court for
further proceedings.'85 Justice Blackmun, writing for the 5-4 major-
ity,'8 6 grounded the opinion on the defendant's "right to testify in her
180. See id. at 11.
181. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
182. Brief for Petitioner at 9.
183. Id. (citing Diamond, supra note 23, at 315 n.7).
184. Brief for Petitioner at 10 (quoting Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67, 723 P.2d at 1384, 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 273).
185. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2715 (1987).
186. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined the Blackmun opinion. Chief
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Id.
at 2706.
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own behalf."' 87 In fact, the holding in Rock represents the most ex-
plicit formulation to date of this amorphous right to testify. The
Court's decision seems to suggest that constitutional considerations
can and should play a part in what was seemingly considered to be a
purely empirical problem of reliability. This section discusses the com-
ponents of the right to testify, and the implications of the Court's
constitutional analysis.
In its opinion, the Court briefly explored the legitimate interests of
the state in maintaining the reliability of a defendant's testimony,
weighed this interest against the constitutional harm done the defen-
dant through an application of the state's evidentiary rule, and con-
cluded that the interests of the state were outweighed by the
defendant's right to testify. In identifying the legitimate interests of
the state in excluding posthypnotic testimony, the Court observed the
general lack of scientific and legal agreement over the various benefits
and liabilities posed by hypnosis. Despite its recognition as a valid
therapeutic technique, the Court noted the lack of consensus over a
suitable definition for hypnosis, and the similar absence of a generally
accepted scientific theory to explain the phenomenon.8 8 The Court re-
jected the "popular" notion that hypnosis guarantees only accurate
recall, and instead concluded that memory refreshment by hypnosis,
when it has any effect at all, appears to prompt "an increase in both
correct and incorrect recollections. ' 1 89
The Court likewise identified the three primary difficulties sur-
rounding hypnotically refreshed testimony: the witness' heightened
level of suggestibility, the tendency to confabulate in order to make
responses more complete and coherent, and memory hardening-a
witness' increased confidence in the truth of the information re-
called. 90 The Court also observed, however, that hypnotic memory
refreshment has "been credited as instrumental in obtaining investiga-
tive leads or identifications," information which has frequently been
corroborated by independent evidence.' 9'
Considering both the benefits and liabilities of hypnotic refresh-
ment, the Court rejected per se exclusion of the defendant's posthyp-
notic testimony. Per se exclusion was unwarranted because less
187. Id. at 2708.
188. Id. at 2713 (citing COUNCIL REPORT, REFRESHING RECOLLECTION, supra note 19, at 1918-
19).
189. Id. (citing COUNCIL REPORT, REFRESHING RECOLLECTION, supra note 19, at 1921).
190. Id. The court cited the findings of both Dr. Orne and Dr. Diamond. See Orne, Hypnot-
ically Induced Testimony, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVEs 171 (G.
Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1985); Diamond, supra note 23, at 333-42.
191. Id. at 2713-14.
19881
212 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:185
restrictive means existed not to guarantee, but to reduce the likelihood
of unreliable testimony being admitted into evidence. The Court en-
dorsed the safeguards adopted in various jurisdictions judicially1 92 and
statutorily. 93 Justice Blackmun's opinion also acknowledged the con-
tinued, though perhaps reduced value of cross-examination to assess
the reliability of a witness' testimony and the undisputed guarantee of
reliability which can be supplied by corroborating evidence. Further,
the decision endorsed the use of both expert testimony and cautionary
instructions in apprising the jury of possible unfairly prejudicial ef-
fects of admitting posthypnotic testimony.""
In light of these considerations, the Court discussed the harshness
of a per se rule as it applied to the defendant in this case. The Court
noted the corroborating evidence supplied by the gun expert, who tes-
tified as to the defective condition of the weapon, and how that testi-
mony tended to confirm facts the defendant only later remembered
about the shooting. In addition, though Dr. Back's hypnotic proce-
dures did not rise to the level of the procedural safeguards required by
the court in Hurd, the tape recordings of Rock's hypnotic sessions at
least provided the trial court with assurances that Dr. Back avoided
suggestive or leading questions. 195 The Court concluded that "circum-
stances present an argument for admissibility of petitioner's testimony
in this particular case, an argument that must be considered by the
trial court." 1 96
The Court justified balancing the legitimate state interest in insuring
the reliability of testimony, and the means by which it was achieved,
against the constitutional rights of the defendant by invoking reason-
ing from Washington v. Texas'97 and Chambers v. Mississippi. 9
These cases not only established the Court's power to assure the con-
stitutionality of state evidentiary rules and procedures, but provided
192. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
193. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714 n.19. See OR. REv. STAT. § 136.675 (1985).
194. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
195. Id. The Court took note of the findings of the trial court, which were contained in the
pretrial order barring admission of facts recalled after the hypnotic session:
Dr. Back was professionally qualified to administer hypnosis. She was objective in the
application of the technique and did not suggest by leading questions the responses
expected to be made by Defendant. She was employed on an independent, profes-
sional basis. She made written notes of facts related to her by Defendant during the
prehypnotic interview. She did employ posthypnotic suggestion with Defendant. No
one else was present during any phase of the hypnosis sessions except Dr. Back and
Defendant.
Id. at 2707 n.3.
196. Id. at 2714.
197. Id. at 2710 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
198. Id. at 2711 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
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powerful support for the right the Court would make explicit in the
Rock opinion-the defendant's right to testify. 99 In Washington, the
Court struck down a state statute which prevented co-defendants from
being introduced as witnesses for one another. Though the statute was
aimed primarily at insuring the reliability of testimony by preventing
cooperating co-defendants from reciprocally testifying to the other's
innocence,200 the Court found that the statute impermissibly infringed
upon the defendant's sixth amendment right to "make the testimony
of a defendant's witnesses admissible on his behalf in court. ' 20' Thus,
in Washington, state evidentiary rules could not intrude upon the de-
fendant's sixth amendment rights.
In Chambers v. Mississippi,2 2 the strict application of that state's
hearsay and "voucher" rules combined to prove similarly offensive to
the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due process. The rules
worked together to effectively exclude testimony concerning confes-
sions of the alleged true murderer, despite corroboration by additional
evidence in the case. The Court established that while the defendant's
rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses are "not absolute and
may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate in-
terests in the criminal trial process, ' 20 3 the various rules concerned
there could "not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of jus-
tice." 204 In Chambers, the Court noted, the state failed to demonstrate
that the "testimony . . .would be unreliable, and thus the defendant
should have been able to introduce the exculpatory testimony.' '205 The
Supreme Court applied these principles in considering the effect of
Arkansas' per se rule on Rock's case:
In this case, the application of that rule had a significant adverse
effect on petitioner's ability to testify. It virtually prevented her from
describing any of the events that occurred on the day of the
shooting, despite corroboration of many of those events by other
witnesses. Even more importantly, under the court's rule petitioner
was not permitted to describe the actual shooting except in the words
contained in Doctor Back's notes. The expert's description of the
gun's tendency to misfire would have taken on greater significance if
the jury had heard petitioner testify that she did not have her finger
on the trigger and that the gun went off when her husband hit her
199. See infra notes 214-66 and accompanying text.
200. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 21 (1967).
201. Id. at 22.
202. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
203. Id. at 295.
204. Id. at 302.
205. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
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arm.
In establishing its per se rule, the Arkansas Supreme Court simply
followed the approach taken by a number of States that have decided
that hypnotically enhanced testimony should be excluded at trial on
the ground that it tends to be unreliable. Other States that have
adopted an exclusionary rule, however, have done so for the
testimony of witnesses, not for the testimony of a defendant. The
Arkansas Supreme Court failed to perform the constitutional
analysis that is necessary when a defendant's right to testify is at
stake.206
Thus, the Court concluded that while the states are permitted to estab-
lish guidelines to assist trial courts in determining when posthypnotic
testimony is so unreliable as to justify exclusion,
[a] State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not
extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case.
Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary
restriction on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by
the State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections. 20 7
Justice Rehnquist dissented and three others joined. 20 8 The dissent-
ers found that the very same factors which the majority held to pro-
vide support for the right to testify also justified Arkansas' rule
excluding posthypnotic testimony. Rehnquist noted that the defen-
dant's right to testify is intended to facilitate the truth-seeking func-
tion of the criminal trial, yet, "advancement of the truth-seeking
function of Rock's trial was the sole motivation behind limiting her
testimony. ' ' 20 9 He also pointed out that in all the cases cited by the
majority recognizing a defendant's right to testify, an underlying cor-
ollary is always that "an individual's right to present evidence is sub-
ject always to reasonable restrictions. ' 210 He found the restriction
206. Id. at 2712 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original), Here the Court effectively distin-
guished the per se rule in Rock from the currently permissible rule in Shirley and other cases
adopting the per se exclusionary approach, by noting their express exemptions for testimony of
the defendant. See id. at 2712 n. 15. The Court expressly refused to rule on whether a per se rule
as applied to a defendant's witnesses could withstand similar constitutional scrutiny. The Court
remarked, "This case does not involve the admissibility of testimony of previously hypnotized
witnesses other than criminal defendants and we express no opinion on that issue." Id.
207. Id. at 2714.
208. Id. at 2715.
209. Id. The Chief Justice failed to note, however, the undeniable truth-seeking function
assumed in this case by corroborating evidence.
210. Id. at 2715-16. Justice Rehnquist cites, among other cases: In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273, 275 (1948); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 295 (1973).
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imposed by the State of Arkansas to be a reasonable one, from which
the defendant should not be "relieve[d] . ..from compliance. '21 1
While noting that the solution imposed by the majority may be
"equally sensible" as the exclusionary rule chosen by the Supreme
Court of Arkansas, the Chief Justice, in closing, expressed some con-
cern over potentially serious administrative difficulties posed in "re-
quiring the matter to be considered res nova by every single trial judge
in every single case." 21 2
Despite its broad wording, the ruling of the Court is deceptively
narrow insofar as it pertains only to a state's per se exclusion of a
defendant's posthypnotic testimony.' However, the various factors
which are explicitly held to comprise the defendant's "right to testify"
can also protect the defendant's right to compulsory process under the
sixth amendment, and the defendant's broad right to present a de-
fense under the fourteenth amendment-both of which have been held
to include the right of the defendant to call witnesses in his or her own
favor. Further, the reasoning invoked in Rock militating against the
per se exclusion of relevant portions of the defendant's testimony
seems to suggest a general disfavor of any per se approach pending
greater scientific understanding of the issues involved. Thus, the fac-
tors invoked in Rock, both explicit and implicit, could be invoked to
preclude the state from excluding, on a per se basis, the posthypnotic
testimony of a defendant's witnesses as well. This argument is devel-
oped in the following section.
III. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY
While the defendant's right to testify in his or her own behalf was
previously recognized in dicta by the Supreme Court,2 4 and raised to
the level of constitutional right by a number of the circuit courts of
appeal,2"' Rock is the first case in which the Court explicitly delineated
211. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 206.
214. Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical Issues,
70 MINN. L. REv. 121, 131 (1985) ("[T]he Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of a
constitutional right to testify in a number of cases, but always in dicta.").
215. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1064
(1986); Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[C]Timinal defendants have
the constitutional right to testify which ... is implicit in the fifth and fourteenth amendment's
due process guarantee of a fair adversarial process and in the sixth amendment's guarantee of
the right to meet and confront accusations, to be present and to present evidence and witnesses
on one's behalf, including the right to present oneself as a witness"), rev'd, Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U.S. 157 (1986); United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
931 (1983); Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 920-23 (7th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Wilcox
v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 118-19 (3d Cir. 1977).
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the defendant's constitutional right to testify in a criminal trial.2 6 The
right to testify does not appear in the Bill of Rights. 21 7 Neither did
such a right exist at the time the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
were framed. 21 8 The right is a stronger version of the defendant's his-
torically developed "right to be heard. ' 219 The right to be heard, un-
like the right to testify, bears an extensive history. At the time of the
Constitution's conception, accepted procedural rules appeared to pre-
clude the defendant from being heard at all, because of the defen-
dant's interest in the outcome of the trial. 220 In 1864, Maine became
the first state to pass a general competency statute, 22' followed by a
majority of states in the twenty years that followed. 222 By contrast, the
right to testify has developed from constitutional roots a mere thirty
years old. Differences between the defendant's right to be heard and
the right to testify were illustrated by the Supreme Court in Ferguson
v. Georgia.
223
Ferguson marked the culmination of the historic transition from a
rule of defendant's incompetency to one of competency. 224 In Fergu-
son the Court considered the constitutionality of a Georgia rule which
prohibited the defendant from offering sworn testimony to the jury.
The statute was the last remaining barrier to the defendant's compe-
tency existing in the fifty states. 25 Though the statute was struck
down on other grounds, 226 the decision had the practical effect of es-
216. See Rieger, supra note 214, at 128 ("[T]he Supreme Court has never squarely held that
a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify").
217. See Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci, and the Defendant's "Right" to Testify,
18 AM. Cpum. L. REx'. 419, 420 (1981).
218. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971).
219. The primary difference is that the right to testify includes the right to present a sworn
statement to the jury, and to be cross-examined accordingly. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S.
570 (1961).
220. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574
(1961); 2 J. WbomoR, EVIDENCE §§ 576, 579 (J. Chadbourne Rev. 1979).
221. See ME. PuB. LAWS ch. 280 (1864).
222. See Note, Due Process v. Defense Counsel's Unilateral Waiver of the Defendant's Right
to Testify, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 522 (1976). For a complete listing of the competency
statutes of the various states (less Georgia's), see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 n.6
(1961). For the Georgia statute, see infra note 227.
223. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
224. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2708.
225. Id. (citing Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577 & n.6, 596-98).
226. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, struck down the statute as a violation of the
defendant's right to counsel. This despite separate opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Clark,
urging a ruling on grounds of the defendant's right to testify. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 599
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Id. at 602 (Clark, J., concurring). See also Clinton, supra note
170, at 760-63.
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tablishing the defendant's competency throughout this country's
courts.
227
After Ferguson, the Court began to speak in terms of a defendant's
right to testify, acknowledging the existence of such a right on several
occasions, but always in dicta.22 In Harris v. New York, the Court
stated "every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own de-
fense, or to refuse to do so." '229 In Brooks v. Tennessee,230 the Court
struck down a statute requiring the defendant to complete his testi-
mony before any testimony for the defense could be heard, reasoning
that such a requirement violates the defendant's right against self-in-
crimination. In so concluding, the Court stated: "Whether the defen-
dant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well as a matter of
constitutional right." ' 23' The Court likewise declared in Faretta v. Cali-
fornia that the right to testify is "essential to due process of law. '232
More recently still, in Nix v. Whiteside,211 the Court stated that al-
though it had "never explicitly held that a criminal defendant has a
due process right to testify in his own behalf, cases in several circuits
have so held, and the right has long been assumed. '234
In Rock, the right has finally received its first explicit formulation.
"At this point in the development of the adversary system, it cannot
be'doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take
the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense. ' 3  The
Court stressed the importance of the testimony of the defendant, 236
and identified the foundation of the right in the fourteenth, the sixth,
and the fifth amendments.
227. Apparently reading Ferguson as declaring the statute's defendant incompetency provi-
sions unconstitutional, the Georgia Legislature amended the statute, providing the defendant
with an option of either testifying or giving an unsworn statement. See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415
(1974). See also Clinton, supra note 170, at 759 n.237. As noted by the Court, defendants had
been competent to testify in the federal courts since 1878, by virtue of a general competency
statute. See Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3481 (1982)).
228. See supra note 214.
229. 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
230. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
231. Id. at 612.
232. 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975).
233. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
234. Id. at 164. The Court cited United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983).
235. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2708.
236. '"In sum, decades ago the considered consensus of the English-speaking world came to
be that there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn testimony of the accused,
who above all others may be in a position to meet the prosecution's case."' Id. (quoting Fergu-
son v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961)).
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The Court noted favorably what had previously been relegated to a
footnote in Faretta v. California, making the right to testify "essential
to due process of law in a fair adversary process." 3 7 The Court flatly
stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall
be deprived of liberty without due process of law include[s] a right to
be heard and to offer testimony.12 38
The Court also found support for such a right in the compulsory
process clause of the sixth amendment, 23 9 which "grants a defendant
the right to call 'witnesses in his favor.' '2 4 The Court extended the
scope of this right, apparently following the lead of several circuit
courts,2 41 to testimony offered by the defendant. The Court stated:
Logically included in the accused's right to call witnesses . . . is a
right to testify himself, should he decide it is in his favor to do so. In
fact, the most important witness for the defense in many criminal
cases is the defendant himself. . . . Like the truthfulness of other
witnesses, the defendant's veracity, which was the concern behind
the original common-law rule, can be tested adequately by cross-
examination. 24 2
The Court in Rock also likened the right to testify to the right of
self-representation. In Faretta v. California, the Court upheld the
right of self-representation as implicit in the natural reading of the
sixth amendment.2 43 Here, the Court reasoned that even more impor-
tant than the right to represent one's self is "an accused's right to
present his own version of events in his own words." 24 The defen-
dant's ability to control his own defense, the Court held, is "incom-
plete" absent the ability to present himself as witness.2 4 Finally, the
Court held that the defendant's right to testify is a "necessary corol-
237. Id. at 2709 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)).
238. Id. at 2709.
239. The compulsory process clause guarantees that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right applies to the states through incorporation via the
fourteenth amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
240. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
241. See United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931
(1983) ("Logically included within the right to call any witness is the accused's right to testify
himself should he possess evidence in favor of the defense"). See also Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d
1071, 1076 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
242. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (citations omitted).
243. 422 U.S 806, 821 (1975).
244. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709-10.
245. Id.
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lary to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testi-
mony. "246
The right to testify, so formulated and now made explicit, is a
broad one. It seems far broader, and carries far broader implications,
than the holding on the specific facts of Rock would permit. Never-
theless, extrapolating from the reasoning provided, and from the vari-
ous factors now held to comprise the fundamental right to testify, the
right may provide support for a more general right to present a de-
fense. 247 Likewise, its sixth amendment foundations might imply that
the testimony of a defendant's witnesses may likewise be held resistant
to exclusion on a mere per se basis.
Because the holding in Rock was expressly limited to protecting
only the testimony of the defendant from arbitrary rules of per se ex-
clusion, a holding which consequently limits the scope of its immedi-
ate implementation, a number of broad questions remain concerning
the future treatment of the admissibility problem. 24 The most pressing
question concerns whether the defendant's right to call witnesses in his
or her behalf following their hypnotic memory refreshment outweighs
the state's interest promoted by per se exclusion. The Court's treat-
ment of the sixth amendment's compulsory process clause, as it per-
tains to a defendant's right to testify, may prove suggestive in
providing an answer.
The compulsory process clause was originally framed in narrow
terms, for a narrow purpose.24 9 The clause provides the defendant a
right to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. ' 250
On its face, the language of the amendment only guarantees that some
form of process remain available, saying nothing of the right of a de-
fendant, or a defendant's witness to testify. The narrow wording of
the clause was not accidental. When James Madison drafted the
amendment, he had access to a number of proposals from the states
after which he could model the wording of the right. They ranged
from Virginia's recommendation that the defendant be guaranteed the
right "to call for evidence in his favor," to the narrower recommen-
246. Id. (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). The Court in Rock noted that in
Harris, a majority of the Court subscribed to the principle that a defendant is guaranteed the
right to "remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered excercise of his own will."
Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). In Harris the court held that testimony
illegally obtained, despite being inadmissible on its own, nevertheless could be used to impeach
the defendant's direct testimony at trial. 401 U.S at 225-26.
247. See generally Clinton, supra note 170.
248. See Stewart, Hypnotized Witnesses, Loaded Jurors, A.B.A. J ., Oct. 1987, at 54, 56.
249. Westen, supra note 170, at 76-77.
250. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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dations from the state of New York, suggesting that the defendant be
given "the means of producing his Witnesses."s2 Madison's version is
seen as a neutral compromise, respecting the demands of the states,
without favoring the language of any one in particular. 212 Madison's
version was accepted by Congress and ratified by the states with little
debate, and with no substantive alteration.23
Through the years, the compulsory process clause remained largely
dormant. Prior to the Supreme Court's first attempt to construe it in
1967, the clause was mentioned only five times by the Court-three
times in declining to construe it, and twice in dictum. 214 The clause
received its first meaningful interpretation in Washington v. Texas,255
where, in the process of becoming a right fundamental to due process
(and thereby applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment),256 the right was expanded considerably beyond its plain
wording.
In Washington, a defense witness' crucial testimony was excluded
"not because the State refused to compel his attendance, but because
a state statute made his testimony inadmissible whether he was present
in the courtroom or not. ' 25 7 Thus, the Court was required to address
whether the clause guarantees a defendant the right to place his wit-
ness on the stand, in addition to compelling his presence in court. 258
The Court responded affirmatively: "[t]he Framers of the Constitu-
tion did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant
the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had
no right to use." ' 259 It is clear that the Court left behind the plain
wording of the sixth amendment, and arguably the intent of the
framers26° in extending its guarantees to insure a defendant the right to
251. See Westen, supra note 170, at 96.
252. Id. at 97, 98.
253. See id. at 98 & n. 115. During the 2 1/2 year debate on the Bill of Rights, the compul-
sory process clause was mentioned only once-when the suggestion that the clause include the
right to a continuance was rejected as superfluous. Id. Madison's original draft provided the
defendant with the right to "a compulsory process . The lone alteration was the deletion
of the indefinite article. Id.
254. Id. at 108.
255. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). For a summary of the facts and holding, see supra notes 200-01 and
accompanying text.
256. Id. at 17-18.
257. Id. at 19.
258. Id.
259. Idat 23.
260. Westen argues, however, that Madison's phrasing of the clause was not intended to
limit its scope to the narrow right to only compel the presence of witnesses at trial. See Westen,
supra note 170, at 99.
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"make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on his be-
half in court." 261
The decision in Rock can be seen as a second phase in this extension
of the logic of the compulsory process clause. In Rock, the Court ac-
cepted unquestioningly the Washington interpretation in acknowledg-
ing that the Clause guaranteed the defendant "the right to call
'witnesses in his favor."' '262 The Court then made an unprecedented
leap in recognizing the defendant himself as a witness for the purposes
of the sixth amendment. 263 Though this line of reasoning was sug-
gested by a handful of the circuit courts, it received extremely harsh
criticism from commentators. In response to one such circuit court
opinion, Carol Rieger writes:
the Second Circuit has stated that, "[liogically included within the
right to call any witness is the accused's right to testify himself
should he possess evidence in favor of the defense." This statement
does not withstand scrutiny, however, because the defendant is the
one witness to whom the compulsory process clause would not apply,
since it is not necessary for the defendant to subpoena himself.
Furthermore, since criminal defendants were incompetent to give
sworn testimony on their own behalf at the time the sixth
amendment was enacted, it is clear that defendants were not intended
to be included under the compulsory process clause .... Finally,
Congress's enactment of a specific statute making defendants
competent to testify demonstrates that legislators one hundred years
ago did not believe the sixth amendment provided this right. Thus,
the compulsory process clause provides little support for the right to
testify. 264
Writing in Rock, Justice Blackmun was surely aware of these criti-
cisms. He acknowledged the function and purpose of Congress' com-
petency statute in the opinion itself. 265 Therefore, the extension of the
compulsory process clause to protect a defendant's right to testify is
an express rejection of these criticisms and an express statement of the
intention of the Court to expand the scope of the amendment's provi-
sions.
To extend the scope of the amendment to pertain to a defendant,
while denying like benefits of such an extention to a defendant's wit-
nesses-a purpose plainly more consistent with the purpose of the
261. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
262. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967)).
263. Id.
264. Rieger, supra note 214, at 137 (footnotes omitted).
265. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2708.
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amendment and its interpretation in Washington-is absurd. The con-
clusion drawn in Rock, that "[a] State's legitimate interest in barring
unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be
reliable in an individual case, ' '2 66 must therefore be extended to apply
to per se exclusions of the testimony of witnesses called by the defen-
dant as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rock will surely be perceived as a significant step in the further con-
stitutionalization of the rights of the defendant. 267 Not only does the
opinion serve both to make explicit the right of the criminal defendant
to testify and to make this right fundamental to due process, but it
can be read as making a broader statement regarding a defendant's
rights in general. It is a logical companion to cases like Washington v.
Texas26 and Chambers v. Mississippi,69 which likewise represent the
proposition that state evidentiary rules or rulings cannot operate in
arbitrary ways at the expense of the criminal defendant. States are
required to evaluate whether the interests served by a particular rule
justify the limitations imposed. In Rock, the state's interest in main-
taining the reliability of testimony for the purpose of advancing the
truth-seeking function of state trial proceedings did not warrant the
per se exclusion of a defendant's posthypnotic testimony, testimony
which "may be reliable in an individual case." 70
Given, however, that the defendant's right to testify is grounded in
the very same holdings, the very same logic, and the very same lan-
guage as that which guarantees the defendant the broad right to pres-
ent a defense, including a right to call witnesses in his favor, these
latter rights must also be balanced against a state's exclusionary inter-
ests. Such an analysis should reveal that the same reasoning used by
the Court in Rock to strike down Arkansas' per se exclusion of a de-
fendant's posthypnotic testimony should be extended to preclude simi-
lar exclusions of the testimony of a defendant's witnesses as well. This
holds particularly true given the existence of a less drastic means of
accomplishing state ends, through the use of the modern balancing
approach to the admissibility of posthypnotic testimony.
266. Id. at 2714.
267. This is particularly crucial given the timing of the opinion. Justice Powell provided the
majority with its fifth vote just months prior to his retirement in 1987. It is possible that Rock
will remain one of the last explicit statements of a defendant's rights for some time to follow.
268. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
269. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
270. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
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Rock also provides practical guidance in addressing the problem of
admissibility. The Court was particularly concerned by the way in
which Arkansas' per se rule of exclusion operated to the detriment of
any defendant who was hypnotized, without regard to the reasons for
hypnotic assistance, the circumstances under which it took place, or
any independent verification of the results it produced. The Court de-
manded, in simplest terms, that the defendant's posthypnotic testi-
mony not be excluded absent a showing that the defendant's
testimony was unreliable in the particular case. The solution suggested
by the Court's decision requires case-by-case consideration, the care-
ful balancing of a host of circumstances surrounding the hypnotic ses-
sion, and consideration of corroborating evidence which may be made
available at trial. In addition, the Rock decision seems to require that
the fundamental constitutional rights of the parties involved be incor-
porated into this calculus.
Only one of the traditional approaches to the admissibility of pos-
thypnotic testimony is sufficiently flexible to accommodate these con-
siderations. A careful, case-by-case balancing approach is required,
particularly since, as demonstrated in Rock, constitutional rights are
implicated.
There are significant dangers associated with permitting unreliable
testimony to implicate a defendant in a crime. Due process and con-
frontation clause problems arise when unreliable identification tech-
niques are used to implicate the defendant absent external indicia of
reliability.27 1 A constitutionally valid balancing approach requires the
presence of such external indicia of reliability before posthypnotic tes-
timony may be used by the prosecution in a criminal case. A number
of factors may be held to supply necessary, but never sufficient condi-
tions upon which to base judgments of reliability, including compli-
ance with procedural safeguards, the presence of corroborating
evidence or testimony of non-hypnotized witnesses, and the degree to
which posthypnotic differs from prehypnotic recall.
However, when the admission of exculpatory posthypnotic testi-
mony is sought by the defendant, the constitutional problems created
by the possible admission of unreliable testimony are supplanted by
the affirmative rights of the defendant to testify on his or her own
behalf, or to present witnesses to do the same. Here, constitutional
considerations militate towards admissibility, absent a showing of un-
reliability, in order to prevent infringement upon the fundamental
rights of the defendant.
271. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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Both sets of concerns can be addressed through the implementation
of the balancing approach, incorporating the constitutional considera-
tions outlined here. The respective constitutional rights of the defen-
dant require that in all cases the burdens of establishing admission or
exclusion of posthypnotic testimony rest with the prosecution. When
admission of posthypnotic testimony is sought against the defendant,
the burden must rest with the prosecution to show the existence of
sufficient external indicia of reliability, to insure that the probative
value of the testimony exceeds its prejudicial effects. When admission
of posthypnotic testimony is sought by the defendant or by witnesses
testifying on the defendant's behalf, the burden must similarly rest
with the prosecution to show unreliability such that the prejudicial ef-
fect of the testimony greatly exceeds its probative value.
In addition, natural checks exist within the system which regulate
the use and inhibit the abuse of posthypnotic testimony. With reliabil-
ity always a primary consideration, it remains in the best interest of
both prosecution and defense to promote reliability through compli-
ance with procedural safeguards like those enumerated in Hurd.7 2
The excessive use of posthypnotic testimony by the defense is regu-
lated by the wide range of tools which remain available to the prose-
cution to show its potential unreliability. These tools include requests
for cautionary instructions, the availability of expert testimony as to
the adverse effects of memory refreshment by hypnosis, and, as al-
ways, cross-examination.
Out of the constitutional concerns illustrated in Rock, and from
cases raising the dangers of admitting unreliable means of identifica-
tion can emerge constitutionally valid solutions to the problem of pos-
thypnotic testimony. A balancing approach, applied with an eye
toward judicially or legislatively established procedural standards can
secure some increased degree of reliability, while retaining necessary
judicial discretion in a necessarily difficult area.
Stevan D. Mitchell
272. See supra text accompanying note 79.
